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CREATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC
IN CORPORATE AMERICA: THE BIG
STICK OF JAIL TIME
by Frederick W. Addison, III* and Elizabeth E. Mack**
I. INTRODUCTION
ONVICTION and incarceration for environmental offenses? Not
long ago this would have been virtually unheard of, with the most
egregious conduct extracting no more than a slap on the wrist and a
nominal fine.I The prosecutorial climate has undoubtedly changed, how-
ever, and since the early 1980's courts have systematically addressed envi-
ronmental offenses. As one congressman noted, "Criminal sanctions are
more appropriate than EPA rule-making. Criminal laws are tougher, more
immutable and less subject to challenge once imposed. '" 2
The current legal climate is less tolerant of environmental offenses, as evi-
denced by more frequent prosecutions and more severe sanctions meted out
by the federal judiciary. For example, in fiscal 1989, federal courts imposed
prison terms totaling almost thirty seven years and $11.1 million in fines for
environmental crimes, compared with less than two years of sentences and
$198,000 in fines five years earlier.3 Prosecutors hope more aggressive crimi-
nal enforcement and the threat of actually serving jail time will deter would-
be violators.4
And it's not simply corporations that are being indicted.5 Indeed, no se-
* B.B.A., Southern Methodist University, 1974; J.D., The University of Texas School of
Law, 1977. Mr. Addison is currently a shareholder at the Dallas law firm of Locke Purnell
Rain Harrell.
** B.A., Northwestern University, 1985; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988. Ms. Mack is
currently an associate at the Dallas law firm of Locke Purnell Rain Harrell.
1. Courts were formerly unwilling to sentence first time white-collar offenders to prison.
See Note, Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1335 (1979).
2. Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), cited in Moore, Collaring Business, 22 NAT'L J. 960, 963
(1990).
3. Stipp, Toxic Turpitude: Environmental Crime Can Land Executives In Prison These
Days, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
4. One EPA criminal enforcement official told The Wall Street Journal that "some peo-
ple thought the agency would look strong if it got a criminal program going." Meier, Dirty Job
Against Heavy Odds, EPA Tries to Convict Polluters and Dumpers, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1985, at
1, col. 4, at 18, col. 1.
5. In fiscal year 1986, 67 defendants were convicted or entered guilty pleas. Of the 67,
only 22 were corporations. Seventeen were presidents or owners, eight were vice-presidents
and four were directors or other officers. Handling Environmental Investigations, CORPORATE
COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Bus. Laws, Inc.) §§ 5.003-.004 (1989).
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nior corporate official is beyond the reach of the prosecutorial net. In May
1990, Paul Tudor Jones II, president of Tudor Investment Corp. and a
prominent futures trader, pled guilty to criminal violations of the Clean
Water Act after having filled wetlands to build a corporate retreat without a
permit.6 He paid $2 million in fines and was sentenced to an eighteen month
probated sentence.
Moreover, in this new era of criminal penalties a cavalier attitude is a
quick ticket to prison, as Robert and Scott McKiel discovered. The father
and son team ran Astro Circuit Corp., an electronics company with about
300 employees. When confronted with evidence of illegally high concentra-
tions of toxic metals in Astro's waste water, the younger McKiel retorted,
"We're guilty. What are you going to do, put us in jail or something?" 7
Exactly. In addition to paying hefty fines, both father and son served jail
time.
In drawing the battle line in environmental cases, Richard B. Stewart,
Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Di-
vision of the Department of Justice (Environment and Resources) said:
"Those who would seek to illegally profit from the environmental conscious-
ness of our citizens are warned - the risk you create for the environment
will be matched by the risk you face of jail."'8 Significantly, his warning
came on the heels of his announcement of a twenty-eight count indictment
against Enviro-Analysts and John R. Reutz, its president, chief executive
officer and owner.9 If convicted as charged, Reutz individually faces over
sixty-six years in prison and $3.84 million in criminal fines.10
Increased criminal prosecutions are the result of nearly a decade of coop-
erative work between Environment and Resources and the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA). In October 1982, the EPA hired its
first criminal investigators.11 The investigators were employed for their ex-
tensive criminal, rather than environmental backgrounds; they were primar-
ily trained in large metropolitan police departments.m2 At approximately the
same time, Environment and Resources created an Environmental Crimes
Unit,13 staffed by attorneys with both criminal and environmental experi-
ence. 14 Since 1982, the policy of the EPA emphasizes the use of criminal
6. Tudor Investment's Jones Pleads Guilty to Filling Protected Maryland Wetlands, Wall
St. J., May 29, 1990, at B5, col. 3.
7. Stipp, supra note 3, at 5, col. 1.
8. Justice Department Files Criminal Charges Against Pollution Testing Firm and its
President, Bus. Wire, Aug. 28, 1990.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379, 381-82
(1986).
12. Id.
13. The Environmental Crimes Unit was upgraded to the status of "section" within Envi-
ronment and Resources in 1987.




sanctions as part of the "EPA's overall enforcement effort." 15
In addition, public opinion also surged in the early 1980's. In a public
opinion poll taken in 1984, 60,000 people were asked to rank the severity of
particular crimes. In seventh place, after murder, but ahead of heroin smug-
gling, was environmental crime. 16 The study indicated that the public con-
siders industrial criminal polluters more nefarious public offenders than
armed robbers and those who bribe public officials. 17 In response to this
public opinion, Congress criminalized virtually every environmental statute
and, in recent years, imposed tougher sanctions by upgrading environmental
crimes from misdemeanors to felonies.' 8 The prosecutorial climate has be-
come so highly charged that "it has become impossible for prosecutors to
decline cases."' 19
The powerful pressures associated with new public sentiment, coupled
with stricter laws and a larger staff of willing and able investigators and
prosecutors, make the threat of facing criminal charges for environmental
offenses more real than ever. Perhaps more importantly, the prosecutorial
burden is not very heavy.20 No longer can an executive hide behind the
shield of having delegated responsibilities to subordinates; indeed, the new
legal climate requires executives to monitor closely all operations in order
to attempt to avoid personal criminal liability for the offenses of the
corporation.
This Article surveys the ever evolving arena of criminal enforcement of
environmental laws. The first section reviews the environmental regulatory
scheme. The second section analyzes individual criminal liability and the
standards for imposing criminal sanctions, including the government's stan-
dards for seeking an indictment. The Article next considers the sentencing
guidelines and the imposition of sentences in environmental crimes. The Ar-
ticle concludes with observations on the effects and future of the criminaliza-
tion of environmental enforcement.
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATROY SCHEME: AN OVERVIEW
The modern use of criminal sanctions to regulate environmental miscon-
15. Memorandum on Criminal Enforcement Priorities from EPA Associate Administer
Robert Perry, reprinted in 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 859 (Oct. 22, 1982).
16. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Jan. 1984, cited in
Starr, supra note 11, at 380 n.l.
17. Id.
18. For example, Congress created new felony sanctions in 1986 under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1989)
(imprisonment for not more than three years for knowingly failing to report release of hazard-
ous substances), and again in 1987 under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (Supp.
1990) (imprisonment for not more than 15 years for certain violations resulting in knowing
endangerment of other persons).
19. Judson W. Starr, founder and former head of the Environmental Crimes Unit, cited in
Weber, Corporate Crime of the 90s: Prosecutors Are Aiming for the Boardroom in a Growing
Push Against Polluters, L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
20. See discussion infra notes 102-25.
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duct began in 1970 with the revitalization of the Refuse Act of 1899.21 The
Refuse Act was little used and largely unknown within the United States. It
made a defendant liable for the discharge of refuse into any navigable water
of the United States. 22 Prosecutors used the Refuse Act because they were
frustrated by their inability effectively to prosecute blatant polluters. As
with all public welfare statutes, the Refuse Act extended liability to corpo-
rate officers as well.23
The passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 forced the Refuse Act back into relative obscurity, appearing infre-
quently since that time.24 But its use in the early 1970s served a commenda-
ble purpose in notifying the regulated community that criminal sanctions
were available if necessary. One commentator has recognized that the true
impact of the Refuse Act is not the sanction by the court but the stigma of
the publicity.25 Nevertheless, the Department of Justice believes that crimi-
nal sanctions for environmental offenses have long been recognized as a pow-
erful enforcement tool.26
Today, the environmental statutes each provide for civil remedies along
with a criminal counterpart. For most of the 1970s and early 1980s, civil
penalties were the primary tool of enforcement. However, because civil pen-
alties did not appear to deter environmental misconduct sufficiently, crimi-
nal enforcement has assumed greater importance and more frequent
application. 27 The theory is that sending responsible persons to prison ulti-
mately will send a louder message28 and arguably prevent greater degrada-
tion of the environment.
Nine statutes comprise the current federal environmental liturgy.29 Two
federal statutes are primarily responsible for control and disposal of hazard-
21. The Refuse Act is the name commonly used for section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C § 407 (1980).
22. Id.
23. See Tripp & Hall, Federal Enforcement Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALB. L.
REV. 60 (1970).
24. The government recently used the Refuse Act to prosecute the Exxon Valdez acci-
dent. See United States v. Exxon Corp., A90-015-CR (D. Alaska Feb. 27, 1990).
25. His comments were as follows:
The primary value of the Refuse Act criminal sanction was, therefore, not its
effect in deterring or punishing an offender through the imposition of monetary
fines. Rather, its primary value lay in the invocation of the criminal sanction
itself, and in the social opprobrium which attaches to anyone convicted of a
crime. Industrial corporations, like anyone else, want to be regarded as respon-
sible members of the community in which they operate, and a criminal convic-
tion for polluting is not a highly valued mark of good citizenship.
Glenn, The Crime of Pollution, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 835, 858 (1973), cited in Riesel, Crimi-
nal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,065, 10,067
(1985).
26. Address of Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natu-
ral Resources Division of the Department of Justice, Locke Purnell Rain Harrell breakfast
(Sept. 26, 1990).
27. Humphreys, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a Common
Law Criminal, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 226, 229 (July 18, 1990).
28. Starr, supra note 11, at 383.
29. See attached Appendix (briefly outlining these statutes).
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ous wastes: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)3 0 as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorizations Act (SARA)31 and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).3 2 CERCLA, also known as Superfund, establishes
a fund to pay for cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Under CERCLA, the
EPA can seek reimbursement for costs associated with the clean-up of a
facility. 33 Moreover, the EPA may seek or enter an order requiring respon-
sible parties to clean up the site.3 4 CERCLA includes criminal penalties for
failure to properly disclose releases of hazardous substances." RCRA pro-
hibits unauthorized dumping of wastes and establishes the "cradle-to-grave"
system for documenting the transportation and disposal of wastes. 36 RCRA
also includes criminal provisions. a7 Like CERCLA and RCRA, the Clean
Water Act,38 the Rivers and Harbors Act,3 9 the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act,4° the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act,4 ' the Toxic Substances Control Act,42 the Ocean Dumping
Act,43 and the Clean Air Act" all contain criminal and civil provisions.
In addition to the threat of prosecution under environmental statutes,
both corporations and officials are subject to the provisions of the criminal
code, Title 18 of the United States Code. The government is not limited to
applying only the criminal provisions of environmental statutes where more
generalized penal provisions are applicable as well. 45 Indeed, several Title
18 offenses are regularly used to prosecute environmental crimes.4
III. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
In both the civil and criminal arenas, a corporate officer is rarely held
personally liable for the corporation's wrongdoings solely because of his po-
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1989), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 9607 (1989).
34. Id. § 9606 (1989).
35. Id. § 9603(b) (1989).
36. Id. § 6928(d)(4) (1982 & Supp. 1990).
37. Id. § 6928(e) (1982 & Supp. 1990).
38. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1987 & Supp. 1990).
39. See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1980).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (1989).
41. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1978 & Supp. 1990).
42. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
43. Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1987).
44. See 42 U.S.C § 7413(c) (1989).
45. Riesel, supra note 25, at 10,070.
46. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1979) (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1979) (false state-
ment); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1979 & Supp. 1990) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1979 & Supp.
1990) (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C § 1962 (1979 & Supp. 1990) (RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1979 &
Supp. 1990) (false claim); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1979) (perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1979 & Supp.
1990) (obstruction of justice); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1979) (aiding and abetting); see also 49 U.S.C
§ 1809 (1981) (transportation of hazardous materials). For an example of the intertwinings of
the environmental statutes and Title 18, see United States v. Goldfaden, CR3-89-362-R (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 6, 1990) (superseding indictment).
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sition within the corporation. A representative who has neither actively par-
ticipated in, nor authorized a violation of the law, has historically been
relieved from personal liability. 47 This rule is frequently followed but is not
absolute, particularly with regard to public welfare regulations, including
environmental statutes. Indeed, public welfare statutes dispense with the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct-specific awareness of some
wrongdoing. 48
The criminal provisions of environmental statutes apply to any "person"
who commits a violation. 49 This provision makes it clear that Congress in-
tended that criminal sanctions be brought against those corporate officers
with the ultimate responsibility for the violation, even when acting solely in
a supervisory capacity. For example, the Clean Water Act expressly pro-
vides that a "person" is "any responsible corporate officer." 50 Thus, when
considering individual liability for corporate acts, the pivotal question be-
comes who may be classified as a "responsible corporate officer." In this
area, courts have been increasingly willing to impose personal liability de-
spite the absence of direct or actual knowledge on the part of the corporate
officer. In the environmental context then, a criminal mind is not always
necessary to sustain a criminal conviction.
A. The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
Two cases provide the foundation for any discussion of the criminal intent
of individuals in the environmental area: United States v. Dotterweich5l and
United States v. Park.52 In each case the Supreme Court imposed criminal
liability on corporate officers simply because the officers had a responsible
relationship to the offense with which they were charged.
Pursuant to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Dotterweich court up-
held the conviction of Joseph H. Dotterweich, the president and general
manager of a pharmaceutical company for shipping adulterated and misla-
beled drugs.53 Dotterweich did not have knowledge of the facts that resulted
in the violation, nor did he actively participate in the distribution of the
shipments. In support of its case the government argued that he was respon-
sible solely because of his position in the company. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction, ruling that a corporation's violation may be attributed
to officers "standing in various relations" to the corporation.54 The Court
concluded that offenses are attributable to "all who have such a responsible
47. United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting United
States v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 639, 644 (D.D.C. 1962)).
48. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act).
49. E.g., Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1987 & Supp. 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)
(1982 & Supp. 1990) (RCRA).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1987 & Supp. 1990).
51. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
52. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
53. 320 U.S. at 278. Dotterweich was a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Stone and Justices
Frankfurter, Black, Douglas and Jackson comprised the majority. Justices Murphy, Roberts,
Reed and Rutledge joined in the dissent.
54. Id. at 283.
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share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws .... ,,55
In the interest of society, the burden is borne by "a person otherwise inno-
cent but standing in responsible relation to public danger."'56
Thus, the responsible corporate officer doctrine was born. At the time of
the Dotterweich decision, the responsible corporate officer doctrine caused
little concern because it appeared to be limited in its application. 57  Dot-
terweich was president of a small company and was responsible for all its
operations. 58 Accordingly, while small businessmen - those tending to be
involved in plant operations - were at risk, officials in larger companies
perceived themselves as insulated. The president of a large company who
was responsible for system-wide operations would certainly not be liable for
violative conditions.
It was not until some thirty years later, in United States v. Park, that the
Supreme Court was asked to address whether a senior officer in a large com-
pany who had delegated responsibility could be held liable. The individual
indicted, John R. Park, was president of Acme Markets, a national food
chain with hundreds of stores and some fourteen warehouses. Both the com-
pany and Park were charged with multiple violations of the Food and Drug
Act, resulting from rodent infestation in two warehouses. The company
pled guilty to all counts, but Park pled not guilty. Park's defense was that of
delegation. He testified that "although all of Acme's employees were in a
sense under his general direction, the company had an organizational struc-
ture for responsibilities for certain functions." 59 Rejecting the delegation de-
fense, the Court found that the law imposed a duty to implement measures
that ensure that violations will not occur, in addition to imposing an affirma-
tive duty to seek out and remedy violations in the event they do occur.60
As draconian as the responsible corporate officer doctrine is in practice, a
few obvious defenses have developed. Park testified that the responsibility
for sanitation had been delegated to subordinates; yet he had been personally
notified repeatedly that the measures were not sufficient. At trial he even
admitted that the system for handling sanitation "wasn't working perfectly"
and that he was in the position to implement change.6' Thus, Park's prob-
lem was in his failure to monitor the corporate conduct and implement
change as he witnessed the system failing. Park's conviction confirmed that
any corporate officer could be convicted based on evidence of the position he
holds, in addition to the conduct in which he may have been engaged.
Consequently, at first glance, when faced with the responsible corporate
officer doctrine, a corporate officer will necessarily want to defend by con-
55. Id. at 284.
56. Id. at 281.
57. This is not to say that there were not subsequent indictments. Some convictions even
led to jail terms. See United States v. Siler Drug Store Co., 376 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1967) (sen-
tenced to one year imprisonment).
58. See generally 1 K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 5:13 - 5:18 (1984)
(discussion of responsible corporate officer doctrine).
59. Park, 421 U.S. at 663.
60. Id. at 672.
61. Id. at 664-65.
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tending that he was powerless to effectuate change. In fact, only where the
defendant offers proof that he was "without the power or capacity to affect
the conditions which founded the charges" is there an additional burden
placed on the government. 62 In other words, Park recognizes an objective
impossibility defense, 63 by permitting a senior official to demonstrate that
despite his negligence, he could not prevent the violations.6 However, this
defense can only be applied on a case-by-case basis, and has yet to be the
foundation for an acquittal. 65
Relying on Park, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Starr, rejected both
the delegation and impossibility defenses where the defendant, Dean Starr,
had not exercised the diligence and foresight expected under the circum-
stances-he did not adequately monitor the operations for which he dele-
gated authority. 66 Affirming the conviction, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
Starr had ultimate responsibility for the operations at the warehouse and,
therefore, responsibility for the conduct "out of which the violations
grew.''67
The food and drug cases remain the intellectual foundation for corporate
officer criminal liability. In Park the Supreme Court determined that the
prosecutor need only establish that the defendant-officer was in a position of
responsibility and that he failed to exercise control over operations which
created the violation. 68 Thus, if the officer has control over the activities,
simple delegation is not enough to remove liability; post-delegation monitor-
ing and insistence on compliance are mandatory under the case law. Indeed,
no safe harbor exists. Both Park and Starr affirm the corporate officer's
unenviable duty not only to monitor and exercise control over the affairs of
the corporation, but to do so effectively. Failing to assume this difficult task
can be as dangerous as failing to succeed at it.
The application of the principles found in Dotterweich, Park and Starr are
62. Id. at 676.
63. The Supreme Court seemingly recognized the impossibility defense in 1964 when a
warehouseman argued that the government was seeking to punish the one "who is, by the very
nature of his business, powerless" to prevent food from being contaminated despite his stan-
dard of care. United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964). The Court
did not decide on the claim because of the procedural posture of the case. See also United
States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting impossibility defense
where evidence established that defendants had failed to take all necessary steps), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1002 (1970); United States v. Y. Hata & Co.. 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976) (instruc-
tion on objective impossibility not warranted where evidence was not present), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 828 (1976).
64. Note, supra note 1, at 1263.
65. The impossibility defense may never be a basis for acquittal because it is unlikely that
the EPA would refer (or the Department of Justice would prosecute) a case without reasonable
certainty that the individual was in a responsible position to prevent the violation and had
some control over the alleged condition. Under those statutes with negligence based, lesser
included offenses, evidence of objective impossibility alone, may be enough to establish crimi-
nal negligence. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1987 & Supp. 1990) (imposes crim-
inal liability for both negligent and willful violations).
66. United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. Id. at 514-15.
68. Park, 421 U.S. at 676.
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not just limited to food and drug cases. 69 Indeed, they demonstrate that
senior officials may be held liable for corporation offenses even when there is
no personal involvement in the offense. Some comfort can be taken, how-
ever, in the fact that the responsible corporate officer doctrine may be con-
fined to cases brought under statutes that do not require a showing of
willfulness or intent.70
B. The Mens Rea Requirement
When the statute itself requires mens rea, or a criminal mind, courts his-
torically require an affirmative act demonstrating, at a minimum, acquies-
cence before holding individual corporate officers liable.71 This standard
suggests that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant acted deliberately
and with awareness of the consequences of his actions, a more significant
burden than that imposed under the "responsible corporate officer" doc-
trine. 72 Unlike cases utilizing the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine, a
superior has not yet been held liable for the action or inaction of those whom
he supervises absent the requisite intent or knowledge. Inquiry into facts
necessary to establish mens rea must focus on what constitutes "intent" or
"knowledge."
The law's required showing of "intent" or "knowledge" does not entirely
eliminate the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine from applicability in
cases brought under statutes requiring scienter.73 Prosecutors need not
prove that a defendant intended to break the law---courts have reduced the
burden on the government by requiring only that the government demon-
strate that the defendant's conduct was intentional and voluntary, as distin-
guished from accidental. 74 This is known as general, rather than specific,
intent.75
69. The Dotterweich - Park analysis has been cited in prosecutions involving other federal
statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Klehman, 397 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1968) (Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982)); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902
(2d Cir. 1978) (Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-708) (1978 & Supp. 1990));
United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)
(Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1319 (1987 & Supp. 1990)).
70. Eg., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1988); Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tions Act, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1988); Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1264(1988).
For example, a corporate officer in charge of overseeing Clean Water Act permit operations
can face criminal charges based on negligent, rather than a knowing, discharge of a pollutant
in violation of the permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (1988). Because the Clean Water Act
provides for prosecution of negligent conduct, one must assume those provisions of the Act
addressed to "knowing" conduct required a demonstration of actual knowledge, direct partici-
pation or willful refusal to act.
71. See generally Seymour, Civil and Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under Fed-
eral Environmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 337, 342 (June 9, 1989) (discussion of Starr
and Dotterweich).
72. Id.
73. Simply defined in this context, scienter is defined as any "previous knowledge of a
state of facts which it was his duty to guard against." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (5th
ed. 1979).
74. McGovern, Hughes & Seager, Criminal Enforcement of Hazardous Waste Laws, in
HAZARDOUS WASTES IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 13 (1990).
75. Janet Goldstein, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Environmental Prosecutions, Central Dis-
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For example, in United States v. Hoflin,76 Hoflin, the Director of the Pub-
lic Works Department for the city of Ocean Shores, Washington, was prose-
cuted for violations arising from the disposal of two types of waste: spent
paint from road maintenance and sludge removed from a city-owned
kitchen. As a defense to one of the counts, Hoflin maintained that he did'not
know that Ocean Shores did not possess a permit to dispose of the paint.
Interpreting subsection (2)(A) of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), the Ninth Circuit
concluded that knowledge of the absence of a permit is unnecessary as a
basis for criminal conviction under RCRA. 77 Hoflin thus reinforces the ex-
pansive notion that only "general," rather than "specific," intent may suffice
to convict an official of an environmental crime.78
As stated earlier, where a statute operates to benefit and protect the public
welfare, whether environmental or otherwise, courts will not require proof of
intent to violate the specific law in issue. In United States v. International
Minerals & Chemical Corp.,79 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the government did not need to prove knowledge of the regulations in order
to obtain a conviction under Interstate Commerce Commission regulations
for the safe transportation of hazardous wastes.80 The Court held that the
government only needed to prove the defendants knowledge that the sub-
stance transported was a hazardous waste."' "[W]here.. .dangerous or dele-
terious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the
probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of
the regulation." '8 2
Citing International Minerals, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Hayes International Corporation83 determined that actual knowledge need
not be proved to sustain a criminal conviction under RCRA.8 4 Hayes oper-
ated an airplane refurbishing plant which generated hazardous waste. A
Hayes employee contracted for the removal of the wastes. Both Hayes and
the employee were convicted of violating RCRA provisions prohibiting the
knowing transportation of hazardous waste to a facility without a permit.
Nevertheless, the district court granted defendants' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because neither Hayes nor the employee knew
that the hauler lacked a permit.8 5
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the RCRA sec-
trict of California, Los Angeles, California, has reiterated that environmental crimes do not
require specific intent. Goldstein, Handling Environmental Investigations, in CORPORATE
COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Bus. Laws, Inc.), § 5.008 (1989).
76. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143, 107 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1990).
77. Id. at 1037-38.
78. See also United States v. Neville Chemical Co., 888 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1989) (reaffirm-
ing Hoflin).
79. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
80. Id. at 564-65.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 565.
83. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
84. Id. at 1503.
85. Id. at 1500.
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tion under which Hayes was prosecuted did not require actual knowledge of
the illegality for conviction.8 6 Instead, the government was required to
prove that the defendant knew that the waste facility to which the contractor
would take the waste lacked a permit.87 The court explained, "a defendant
acts knowingly if he willfully fails to determine the permit status of a facil-
ity."' 8 The court further relieved the government's burden by concluding
that knowledge could be inferred from circumstantial evidence: in this case,
the mere fact that the disposal contract quoted an unusually low price.89
The Hayes decision opens the door for future prosecutions based on what
a corporate officer "should know." 90 In holding that a defendant acts know-
ingly if he should have known about permit status, the Eleventh Circuit de-
termined that "constructive knowledge" suffices to impose individual
criminal liability. The court's reasoning virtually eliminates the govern-
ment's already diminished burden of proving intent and drastically alters
traditional norms for establishing criminal guilt.91
The Third Circuit has also embraced the conclusion that "constructive"
knowledge satisfies the requirements of criminal intent. In United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc. ,92 the corporation and two mid-level managers were
charged with conspiracy to violate RCRA by disposing hazardous wastes
into a ditch. The court held that employees who knowingly treat, store or
dispose of hazardous waste may be held criminally liable if they knew that
the corporation was required to obtain a permit and also that the corpora-
tion did not possess a permit.93 As in Hayes, the Third Circuit ruled that
knowledge could be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 94 The court
noted that "knowledge, including that of the permit requirement, may be
inferred... as to those individuals who hold the requisite responsible posi-
tions with the corporate defendant." 95
The Second Circuit extended the reach of the constructive knowledge ap-
proach in United States v. Carr.96 The Second Circuit concluded that con-
structive knowledge establishes culpability if a person "of relatively low
rank" is "in a position to detect, prevent, and abate a release of hazardous
substances."'97 Thus, criminal intent may be inferred even in the case of
86. Id. at 1503, 1505.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1504.
89. Id., see also U.S. v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1982) (intent to dump illegally in-
ferred), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); U.S. v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (de-
fendant convicted under CERCLA where he was active in day to day operations and had
approved of prior disposals of hazardous wastes without a permit).
90. Nittoly, Current Trends in the Prosecution of Environmental Offenses, 5 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) 161, 162 (July 4, 1990).
91. Although the precise issue has not yet been litigated, by requiring the government to
demonstrate only "constructive knowledge," arguably, an accused's fifth amendment rights are
substantially impaired, if not eliminated.
92. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
93. Id. at 669.
94. Id. at 670.
95. Id.
96. 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989) (CERCLA case).
97. Id. at 1554.
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lower level supervisors who have "control over" activities that result in
violations.
The importance of Johnson & Towers, Hayes and Carr cannot be over-
stated. While these cases do not employ the same reasoning as those follow-
ing the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine, the burden of proof required
of the government, as well as the results, are substantially the same. The
cases establish criminal liability where the official, by reason of his position,
knew or should have known of illegal activities. Moreover, the jury is al-
lowed to infer this knowledge from circumstantial evidence. In short, these
cases suggest that even where a statute requires scienter, the reckless, negli-
gent or even inopportune decisions by a corporate officer may result in his
prosecution.98
Because the requirement of criminal intent has been virtually eliminated
from environmental prosecutions, many legal scholars are questioning what
remains of basic constitutional protections.99 The environmental laws are
changing at a rapid pace, implying that conduct not previously considered
criminal may now lead to prosecution and conviction. 100 Individuals have
been and will continue to be convicted without ever having been aware of the
crime. Thus, renewed emphasis must be placed on compliance, as well as
the careful disposition of civil or administrative citations. Equally important
is an understanding of the criteria that the government uses for determining
whether to seek an indictment.
C. Seeking An Indictment
As in all criminal areas, the decision to prosecute an environmental of-
fender rests within the unbridled discretion of the government's attorney.
According to Richard B. Stewart,' 10 when a case comes to the Department
of Justice, the Environmental Crimes Section assigns a staff attorney to look
at the issues and prepare a prosecution memorandum.102 The assistant sec-
tion chief and then the section chief review the memorandum. 0 3 Mr. Stew-
art ultimately reviews it himself, and he approves every decision to seek an
indictment. 104 Ostensibly, the decision to seek an indictment rests not on
whether an indictment can be obtained but on whether the government can
get a felony conviction. 105 As a result Stewart explained, the conviction rate
98. Arkin, Crime Against the Environment, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3.
99. Id. See also Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,065 (Mar. 1985); Weber, Corporate Crime of the '90s: Prose-
cutors Are Aiming for the Boardroom in a Growing Push Against Polluters, L.A. Times, Nov.
25, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
100. Arkin, supra note 98.
101. Mr. Stewart is Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Di-
vision, Department of Justice.







for environmental crimes is above 95%.106
Currently, few clear policies apparently exist that can effectively serve as
guidelines for corporations and officials. Indeed, a former federal prosecutor
of environmental crimes has stated: "[t]he criminal prosecution of adultery
and violation of environmental statutes have at least three things in com-
mon. Enforcement is selective and erratic and the consequences often are
harsh."10 7
In an attempt to provide some guidance, the EPA published the following
considerations that will ultimately affect the decision to pursue criminal
sanctions: the existence of the proof of the requisite criminal intent, where
necessary; the nature and seriousness of the offense; the deterrent effect of the
prosecution; the subject's history of compliance; and whether an alternative
remedy would be more practicable.108 Not surprisingly, the EPA stresses
that its primary goal, the one that affects prioritization more significantly
than anything else, is to deter future misconduct. 109
Along with the announced EPA guidelines, the Department of Justice has
promulgated similar factors for determining whether to bring a criminal in-
dictment, environmental or otherwise. They are as follows:
(a) federal law enforcement priorities;
(b) the nature and seriousness of the offense;
(c) the deterrent effect of the prosecution;
(d) the person's culpability in connection with the offense;
(e) the person's history with respect to criminal activity;
(f) the person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation; and
(g) the probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted. 10
The Department of Justice considers these factors after the EPA refers the
case.
Another significant consideration for both the Department of Justice and
the EPA is whether the violation impinges on the regulatory process. I I The
EPA's enforcement efforts rely heavily on industries' voluntary reporting." 12
"Violations that involve destruction or falsification of documents, or that
otherwise threaten the integrity of the reporting system, provide the govern-
ment with special incentives to prosecute."' '13 Because of this policy, corpo-
106. Id.
107. Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,065 (Mar. 1985).
108. Kafin & Port, Environmental Enforcement: Criminal Sanctions Lead to Higher Fines
and Jail, NAT'L L. J., July 23, 1990, at 20 (citing Memorandum from Robert M. Perry, Asso-
ciate Administration of the EPA, to Regional Counsels, Criminal Enforcement Priorities For
the Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 12, 1982) (emphasis added)).
109. Kafin & Port, supra note 108, at 21.
110. U.S. Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution (1980) cited in, Seymour,
supra note 71, at 343.
111. Kafin & Port, supra note 108, at 20.
112. Id.
113. Id. See Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement:
How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478 (Dec. 1987). This
means that bad faith reporting and failure to report is a top enforcement priority. See Convic-
tion in Water Pollution, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1990, at A20, col. 1. John Borowski, president
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rations should implement comprehensive monitoring mechanisms based on
periodic written reports, and corporate officials should be independently in-
volved in the company's regular audit process. Unfortunately, after estab-
lishing such a program, the failure to execute it effectively can also be
adverse evidence in a criminal prosecution. 114 Additionally, administrative
compliance and resolution of alleged administrative violations must be han-
dled carefully. Admissions of past violations, in Administrative Consent Or-
ders or in other forms, can be the basis for actual or constructive knowledge
as well as demonstrating a history of non-compliance.
F. Henry Habicht IV, former assistant attorney general in charge of Envi-
ronment and Resources, believes that prosecuting high corporate officials
will have a deterrent effect. 115 Effectively preying on corporate America's
fear of incarceration and the associated stigma, including, in most cases, the
complete destruction of an individual's professional career, 1 6 the EPA and
the Department of Justice seek to weed out environmental offenders and
deter future degradation of the environment.' 1 7 The combination of the ef-
forts by the Department of Justice, the EPA and the continued surge of
public opinion ultimately means that the number of successful prosecutions
will steadily increase. Thus, in light of the government's decreased burden
at trial, the determination of whether to indict is critical.
D. The Environmental Crimes Act of 1990
The impact of environmental criminal statutes on corporate officials will
only increase with The Environmental Crimes Act of 1990 now pending
before Congress.11 8 The legislation proposes to criminalize any "environ-
mental offense" where the violator knowingly, recklessly or negligently en-
of Borjohn Optical Technology, Inc. was recently convicted of a charge of "knowing endanger-
ment" under the Clean Water Act for directing employees to dispose of toxic waste water in
the local sewers. He knew that the dumping was illegal but considered it "like not counting
tips for income tax." Stipp, Toxic Turpitude: Environmental Crime Can Land Executives In
Prison These Days, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at AI, col. 1.
114. Address of Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natu-
ral Resources Division, Department of Justice, Locke Purnell Rain Harrell Breakfast, Dallas,
Tex. (Sept. 26, 1990).
115. Habicht, supra note 113, at 10,480. The Justice Department and EPA strongly be-
lieve that members of the regulated community will be less likely to consider willful or calcu-
lated evasion of environmental standards when they know that discovery might lead to a
prison term. It is no accident, therefore, that three times as many individuals have been prose-
cuted by the Environmental Crimes Section as corporate defendants .... It has been, and will
continue to be, Justice Department policy to conduct environmental criminal investigations
with an eye toward identifying, prosecuting and convicting the highest-ranking, truly responsi-
ble corporate officials.
116. Unlike a civil suit, the mere presentment of an indictment "will often have a devastat-
ing personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo."
United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
117. Habicht tempered his tone by noting that a company will probably not be prosecuted
if it has diligent reporting and environmental compliance policies and information systems and
has a record of responding promptly when problems or accidents occur. "Actions to conceal
or to mislead the government, along with a substantive violation of pollution laws, will virtu-
ally guarantee felony indictment and conviction . Habicht, supra note 113, at 10,481.
118. H.R. 3641, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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dangers life or causes an "environmental catastrophe."'1 9 The sanctions
vary depending on the offender's state of mind, ranging from one year in
prison to thirty years incarceration and fines between $500,000 and $2
million. 120
The proposed legislation would authorize judges to order convicted com-
panies to hire an independent expert to conduct an environmental audit.121
The audit would be used to determine how to eliminate factors causing the
violation in an effort to avoid future violations. 22 The omnibus legislation
seeks to enhance sentences by creating comprehensive criminal penalty
provisions. 123
This legislation, as presented, appears strikingly vague. Without clear def-
initions of the terms "environmental catastrophe" or "serious bodily injury,"
neither individuals nor corporations are provided notice of the conduct that
the law seeks to prohibit. Indeed, violation of the environmental statutes
now carries a serious penalty.' 24 Consequently, the Fifth Amendment man-
dates that a statute give fair warning of the proscribed behavior. 25 As cur-
rently drafted, the Environmental Crimes Act of 1990 may not be able to
withstand rigorous constitutional scrutiny.
E. The Sentencing Guidelines126
Pursuant to the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 127 the United
States Sentencing Commission, an independent commission in the judicial
branch, drafted sentencing guidelines that impose a range of punishment
available for federal crimes. 128 While the Sentencing Manual specifically ad-
dresses few crimes, environmental offenses are separately proscribed in Sec-
tion 2Q of the Sentencing Guidelines. 129 Seven guidelines specifically
address environmental crimes.' 30






124. Penalties vary, with a possibility of imprisonment for one to 30 years and fines ranging
from $500,000 to $2 million. Id.
125. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.").
126. For a discussion of the Sentencing Guidelines in general, see Ogletree, The Death of
Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988).
For a discussion of how the guidelines affect sentencing for environmental crimes, see Sharp &
Shen, The (Mis)application of Sentencing Guidelines to Environmental Crimes, 5 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) 189 (July 11, 1990).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
128. The Guidelines became effective Nov. 1, 1989, affecting violations that occurred after
November 1987.
129. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
10 (West 1989).
130. Id. §§ 2Q1.1-2Q2.2. Most environmental offenses fall under § 2Q1.2 - Mishandling
of hazardous or toxic substances or pesticides; record keeping, tampering and falsification -




judges must impose a certain sentence on a convicted environmental of-
fender.131 It matters not whether the individual is the president and chief
executive officer of the corporation or simply the maintenance person. 3 2
Generally, the application of the guidelines involves determining the "base
offense level" for a specific crime, and adding in any "specific offense charac-
teristics" identified in the guidelines. 133 For example, if the offense other-
wise involved a discharge or release of a hazardous substance, then the base
level offense increases four levels. 134 Adjustments are then calculated taking
into account the defendant's role in the offense,135 acceptance of responsibil-
ity for the offense13 6 and efforts to obstruct justice. 137 Finally, the defend-
ant's criminal history factors into the equation, leaving the judge with a raw
mathematical score.138 The judge applies this score (or level) to a matrix
which indicates a sentencing guideline range from which the judge cannot
depart without clearly justifying the departure. 139 At least one appeals court
has confirmed that departures from the guidelines are considered the excep-
tion rather than the rule. 140
Most significantly, the guidelines have severly curtailed the opportunity to
hand out a probated sentence. The judge has discretion to impose probation
only if either the minimum term of imprisonment is at least one but not more
than six months, provided that the court imposes a condition of intermittent
confinement, or the minimum term within the permissible range is three
months. 141 Because most environmental crimes lead to a base offense level
of more than six months, most environmental defendants will be ineligible
for probation.142 In other words, not only are more individuals facing in-
dictment and conviction, but the penalties are more severe as well.143 The
likelihood of serving a prison term is greater than ever, even for a first
131. The United States Supreme Court has held that the guidelines are constitutional in
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).
132. Kafin & Port, supra note 108, at 21.
133. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 129, at § IBI.1.
134. Id. § 2Q1.2(b)(l)(B).
135. For example, § 3B1.1(a) allows an addition of 4 levels if the defendant was an orga-
nizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more persons. Id. § 3B1.1(a).
136. A court may adjust downward two levels if a "defendant clearly demonstrates a recog-
nition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct .... Id.
§ 3E1.1.
137. Id. § 3C1.1.
138. For a look at one court's consideration of the evidence to be considered in arriving at
the appropriate offense level, see United States v. Bogas, 731 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
139. Any departure from the guideline range is subject to appellate review. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 (1988).
140. United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1989).
141. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 129, § 5Cl.1(c).
142. But see Bogas, 731 F. Supp. at 252 (four years probation after pleading guilty to crimi-
nal charges involving failure to report disposal of hazardous waste).
143. If the guidelines provide a sentence that would exceed the statutory maximum, then
the statutory maximum controls. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(b) (1988); UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION, supra note 129, § 5Gl.1 (statutory maximum governs as to imprisonment
term). For example, the Clean Water Act sets a statutory maximum of three years for "know-






Criminal sanctions are swiftly joining civil remedies as tools of environ-
mental enforcement. Corporations and officers alike risk facing indictment
and conviction for environmental wrongdoing. Even environmental acci-
dents can lead to a prison term if a senior official, with diligence, could have
foreseen the occurrence or held a position to effectuate change which could
have prevented the accident.
Environmental audit procedures provide some insulation for the corpora-
tion and its officers. Through internal auditing procedures, a corporation
and its officers can monitor the effectiveness of compliance efforts. System-
atic monitoring through auditing will ultimately reduce exposure to liability.
In the event auditing reveals a breakdown in compliance or compliance
procedures, the corporation should act swiftly. Delays in correcting
problems can evidence lack of concern and, ultimately, intent sufficient for
conviction. Indeed, corporations that demonstrate strong compliance
records and a willingness to act rapidly when necessary are less likely targets
for criminal enforcement.
The threat of criminal prosecution based on an officer's position of respon-
sibility or his constructive knowledge creates a minefield through which cor-
porate America must walk daily. The combination of the criminalization of
the environmental statutes, the strong public opinion against environmental
offenders and the sentencing guidelines - virtually removing the possibility
of a probated sentence - forces corporations and their officers to take notice
of environmental regulations. The government's diminished burden of proof
and the existence of few effective defenses result in remarkably high convic-
tion rates. Thus far, the environmental statutes, judicial decisions, and regu-
lations do not define any clearly delineated "safe harbor" for corporate
conduct. Instead, current developments reveal that the government has
elected to employ the big stick of conviction and jail time in order to forge an
environmental ethic for corporate America.





MARINE PROTECTION, RESEARCH, AND SANCTUARIES ACT
(MPRSA)
(aka Ocean Dumping Act)
FEDERAL CITATION: 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1988)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Part 220
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs dumping of material into ocean waters
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 33 U.S.C. §§ 1411 and 1415(b)
- unpermitted transportation of any material for
the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any person
(2) knowingly transported from the U.S.
(3) material
(4) for the purpose of dumping it
(5) into ocean waters
CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA)
FEDERAL CITATION: 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1988)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Part 401 et seq. (pretreat-
ment standards)
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs discharge of pollutants into waters of the
U.S.
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c) and 1321(b)(5)
- unpermitted (NPDES or 404) discharge of any
pollutant into waters of the U.S. (c)(1) and (2)
- discharge of any pollutant into POTW in viola-
tion of pretreatment standards (c)(1) and (2)
- introduction into sewer system any pollutant
which could cause personal injury/property
damage or cause POTW to violate its NPDES
permit (c)(1) and (2)
- knowing endangerment, i.e., placement of seri-
ous bodily injury during knowing discharge of
pollutants (c)(3)
- false statement/tampering with monitoring de-
vice (c)(4)
- failure to notify U.S. agency of oil or hazardous
substances discharge into navigable water of
U.S. [33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)]
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any person
(2) knowingly discharged
(3) a pollutant
(4) from a point source
(5) into waters of the U.S.
(6) without an NPDES permit
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RESOURCE CONSER VATION AND RECOVER Y ACT (RCRA)
(aka Solid Waste Disposal Act)
FEDERAL CITATION: 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1982 & Supp. V 1987)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Parts 261 (identification of
hazardous waste)
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs transportation, storage, treatment and
disposal of hazardous waste.
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928 (d) and (3)
- transportation of hazardous waste to a unper-
mitted facility (d)(1)
- treatment/storage/disposal of hazardous waste
without or in violation of a permit (d)(2)
- omission of information or false statement
(d)(3)
- destruction or alteration of/failure to keep re-
quired records (d)(4)
- transportation of hazardous waste without a
manifest (d)(5)
- exportation of hazardous waste to another
country without its consent (d)(6)
- storage/treatment/transportation of used oil in
violation of permit (d)(7)
- knowing endangerment, i.e., placement of an-
other in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury during transportation, storage,
treatment or disposal of hazardous waste (3)
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any person
(2) knowingly disposed of
(3) hazardous waste
(4) proof of criminal intent
EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW
ACT
FEDERAL CITATION: 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 et seq. (Supp. V 1987)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Part 300 and Part 355
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Enacted following the Bhopal, India disaster.
The act covers four areas-(1) Emergency plan-
ning, (2) Emergency notification, (3) Community
right-to-know reporting regarding chemicals
and, (4) Emissions inventory.
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(4)
- any person knowingly and willfully failing to
provide notice required by 42 U.S.C. § 11004
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any person
(2) knowingly and willfully
(3) fails to provide notice
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(4) of a release
(5) at a facility
(6) the Release requires notification under
CERCLA
RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT
(aka Refuse Act)
FEDERAL CITATION: 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1988)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 33 C.F.R. Parts 320 through 324
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs any construction near or obstruction of
U.S. navigable waters
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 33 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407 and 411
- unauthorized construction of any dam or dike
in any navigable water of the U.S.
- unauthorized building of any pier, breakwater
or jetty in any navigable river or other water of
the U.S.
- unauthorized excavation, fill, or alteration of
any navigable water of the U.S.
- unpermitted discharge or depositing of any re-
fuse into any navigable water of the U.S.
- unpermitted depositing of any material on the
bank of any navigable water
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any person
(2) disposed of refuse
(3) into a navigable water of the U.S.
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT [CER CLA)
(aka Superfund)
FEDERAL CITATION: 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1982 & Supp. V 1987)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Part 302 (identification of
hazardous substances)
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs the notification and clean up of spill or
releases of hazardous substances into the
environment
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)
- failure to notify immediately the appropriate
U.S. agency upon learning of the release of a
hazardous substance into the environment
- submission of false/misleading information in
any notification of release into that environment
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any person in charge of a vessel or
facility
(2) from which a reportable quantity
(3) of a hazardous substance
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(4) was released into the environment
(5) failed to notify immediately the Na-
tional Response Center
(6) as soon as he had knowledge of the
release
FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT
(FIFRA)
FEDERAL CITATION: 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1988)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Parts 162 and 165
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs use of pesticides
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 7 U.S.C. §§ 136j and 1361
- distribution/sale/shipment of an unregistered
pesticide (1)(A)
- removal/alteration/destruction of any required
labelling (2)(A)
- refusal to keep records or to allow inspec-
tion/sampling (2)(B)
- improper use of a restricted use pesticide
(2)(F)
- use of any pesticide in a manner inconsistent
with its labelling (2)(G)
- use of any cancelled pesticide (2)(K)
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any commercial applicator, distributor,
private applicator or person
(2) knowingly used a pesticide
(3) in a manner inconsistent with its label
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA)
FEDERAL CITATION: 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1988)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Part 761
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs storage and disposal of polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs)
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b)
- failure to place warning labels on PCB articles,
containers, storage areas or transport vehicles
(40 C.F.R. § 761.40)
- improper disposal of PCB articles, liquid, or
contaminated soil/clean up debris (40 C.F.R.
§ 761.60)
- storage of any PCB article or container for over
a year; storage of any PCB article or liquid in
an improper storage container or area; failure to
date stored PCB articles or containers (40
C.F.R. § 761.65)
- failure to keep proper records of re-
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moval/storage/disposal of PCB articles or con-
tainers (40 C.F.R. § 761.180)
ELEMENTS OF BASIC CRIME: (1) any person
(2) knowingly/willfully disposed of
(3) a PCB transformer
(4) in violation of regulations
CLEAN AIR ACT (CAA)
FEDERAL CITATION: 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 1987)
PRIMARY FEDERAL REGULATIONS: 40 C.F.R. Part 61
STATUTORY SUMMARY: Governs emission of hazardous air pollutants
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS: 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)
- additional violation of any implementation plan
more than 30 days after notification of violation
by the EPA Administrator (1)(A)
- operation of any new stationary source in viola-
tion of applicable standards of performance
(1)(C)
- release of other designated hazardous air pollu-
tant in violation of emission standards (1)(C)
- false statement/tampering with monitoring de-
vice (2)
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